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 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REPORT

CO NO.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR 28 November 1951

SUBJECT 1. Inspection of South China by Soviet Technical
 Advisory Group
 2. Alleged Chinese Communist Directives on Plans
 for World-Wide Offensives in 1951

NO OF PAGES 2

PLACE
ACQUIREDNO OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

25X1A

DATE OF
INFO.

Mid-September, 15-17 October 1951, as stated

SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1X
REPORT NO.Taiwan, Taipei

1. In mid-September 1951 a Soviet technical advisory group arrived in Foochow from Peining. From Foochow this group and a number of Fukien government representatives inspected South Fukien. During their stay in Fukien, members of the advisory group told Fukien government representatives they believed that, if the Korean truce talks fail, United Nations forces will aid the Nationalists in an invasion of the East China coast.

Hong Kong

2. On 17 October the Chinese Communist Politburo dispatched Decision Number 2746 to all branch bureaus concerning its three major missions for 1951. According to this Decision, on 15 October the Political Consultative Council resolved at an extraordinary session to complete this year's three missions of aid to Korea, aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and liberation of Taiwan. The USSR will complete these missions if Chinese Communist efforts are blocked. Because the United States intends to establish a "Defense Line for Japan" north of the 38th Parallel and to convert South Korea into a major military base in the Far East, it has been impossible to drive the United Nations army from Korea or to realize a cease fire. Consequently, the USSR has decided to enter the battle and launch a decisive offensive. The Chinese Communists are prepared to undergo sacrifices in the northeast to annihilate American forces in Korea and China (sic) and are prepared to direct the main Chinese Communist air might against the enemy's rear in this offensive. The three missions of the USSR for 1951 include a major offensive in Eastern Europe; and, if outstanding problems are not solved at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, the offensive in Europe is to be coordinated with the offensive in Korea.
3. The Chinese Communist mission to aid the DRV is to be conducted jointly

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with the Korean offensive. There is no need to launch an "Autumn Harvest Offensive" in Indochina at present because the food situation there has improved as a result of the decision to send the rice originally intended for India to DRV forces. In order to defeat American imperialistic designs in Asia, the three major Chinese Communist missions must be completed simultaneously. However, the Americans must be permitted to concentrate their armed might in Asia before being dealt the final blow. The Chinese Communist reason for fighting the United States is not to win territory in Asia but to destroy the military and industrial might of the United States. The USSR has decided to seize the present opportunity to launch a general offensive without waiting for World War III(sic), and she will not leave the enemy alone until next year. The future of the Chinese Communists depends on this one struggle and therefore they must rally the masses to prepare for a general war. The Chinese Communists should begin the three major tasks of centralizing organization, production, and mobilization. All should support Stalin's order to resist the enemy and be prepared to act by late November.¹

25X1X
4.

[REDACTED] has also received a special directive stating that China and the USSR already have started mobilization and will definitely launch a general counteroffensive which will be equivalent to a third world war. The directive also states that the cease-fire talk in Korea is already a thing of the past, and the Communists regard it as a cover for a Chinese Communist counteroffensive.

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[REDACTED] Comment. This information should be treated with reserve because information in the past has appeared to be in the form of propaganda directives for Chinese Communist party workers or possibly intelligence plants.

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1. [REDACTED] Comment. This decision deserves close attention. All Chinese Communist official documents issued as "Decisions" have greater importance than orders or directives.

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